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BATTLE ACTION REPORT 2
31 MARCH 1945 TO 28 MAY 1945
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ACTION REPORT 
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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND968133
 By CC NARA Date 12/11/97

USS OAKLAND                    CL 95

SERIAL 001                4 JUNE 1945

U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL95) - ACTION REPORT OKlNAWA GUNTO  OPERATION, FOR PERIOD 31 MARCH 1945) TO 28 MAY 1945.

COVERS ACTIVITIES IN SCREEN OF TASK FORCE 58 DURING
STRIKES ON OKINAWA 

125773

OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

From: Commanding Officer. 

To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

Via : (1) Commander Task Unit 58-3.3 (Commander Cruiser Division SEVENTEEN).

(2) Commander Task Group 58.3 (Commander Carrier Division ONE).

(3) Commander Task Force 58 (Commander FIRST Carrier Task Force, Pacific Fleet).

(4) Commander FIFTH Fleet. (5) Commander-in-Chief., U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject-. U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL95) - Action Report, OKINAWA GUNTO Operation., for period 31 March 1945 to 28 May 1945.

Reference: (a) PacFlt Conf. Ltr. 1CL-45 dated 1 January 1945.

Part I. Brief Summary

The U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL95) left ULITHI on 31 March 1945 in company with U.S.S. MOBILE (CL63) and four escorts enroute to OKINAWA. On 2 April
1945 U.S.S. OAKLAND joined Task Group 58.4 which made a strike on SAKISHIMA GUNTO on 5 April 1945. On 6 April, U.S.S. OAKLAND was detached from Task Group 58.4, joining Task Group 58.2 on 7 April. On 10
April, U.S.S. OAKLAND was transferred to Task Group 58.3 where she
 
remained for the remainder of the period covered by this report.

Task Group 58.3 thereafter operated with other task groups of Task Force 58 in an area centered about sixty miles to the eastward of OKINAWA JIMA, supporting the amphibious operations of Task Force 51. This was varied with a carrier aircraft strike on KYUSHU and SHIKOKU on 13-14 May. Every fourth
 
or fifth day Task Group 58.3 retired to the southeastward for replenishment. Task Group 58.3 was attacked frequently by Japanese aircraft, and particular mention is made herein of attacks occurring on 11 April, 16 April, 17 April, 29 April, 11 May and 14 May, during which U.S.S. OAKLAND took enemy aircraft under fire. U.S.S. OAKLAND claims credit in the destruction of the following aircraft:

16 April at 1856 - Assisted in destruction of a FRANCIS.

17 April at 0925 - Sure destruction of a KATE.

14 May at 0805 - Assisted in destruction of a ZEKE.

14 May at 0813 - Assisted in destruction of a ZEKE.

On 28 May Task Group 58.3 became Task Group 38.3. On 29 May Task Group 38.3 was ordered to proceed to Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands for repairs, replenishment and recreation, to arrive 1 June.

This period of underway steaming lasted for 63 consecutive days.

Part II. Preliminaries

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A. During the major part of the period reported on, the OAKLAND operated with Task Group 58.3, a fast carrier group of Task Force 58. Task, Group 58.3 was commanded by Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman, U.S.N. (ComCarDivOne,, U.S.S. ESSEX, Flagship) and was organized as follows:

58.3.1 Air Force.6.Rear Admiral F.C. Sherman, U.S.N. 

ESSEX (F) (CV- 9) (10 April to 28 May) 

BUNKER HILL (F7) (CV-17) (10 April to 11 May) 

ENTERPRISE (CV- 6) (10 to 14 April, 6 to 16 May) 

RANDOLPH (CV-15) (17 April to 28 May) 

BATAAN (CVL29) (10 to 17 April 26 April to 28 May) 

LANGLEY (CVL27) (10 and 11 May 

MONTEREY (CVL26) (12 May to 28 May)

58-3.1 Heavy Support Vice Admiral W.A. Lee, U.S.N. 

SOUTH DAKOTA (F)(BB-57) (10 April to 11 May)

WASHINGTON (BB-56) (15 April to 28 May) 

NORTH CAROLINA (BB-55) 15 to 27 April) 

NEW JERSEY (BB-62) (10 to 14 April)

MISSOURI (B-64) (5 to 7 May) 

ALABAMA (BB-60) (12 May to 28 May)

58.3.3 Light Support Rear Admiral J.C. Jones, U.S.N. 

CruDiv 17 4 CL (10 April to 29 May)

OAKLAND (CL-95) CLAA (30 April to 28 May)

58.3.4 Screen Captain J.P. Womble, U.S.N. 

DesRon 52 (17 April to 28 May) 

DesRon 62 (10 April to 28 May) 

DesRon 48 (10 April to 28 May)

Note: The dates in parentheses are the inclusive dates after 10 April during which the unit concerned operated with Task Group 58-3. The composition of the DesRons varied somewhat during that period, with Task Unit 58.3.4 averaging between 20 and 22 destroyers-in strength.

B. Part III contains an account of the operations of the U.S.S. OAKLAND during the periods that Task Group 58.3 was under attack. A day to day account of operations is omitted because this material is duplicated in the ship's log and war diary and in the action reports of the commanders of the various task groups with which the U.S.S. OAKLAND operated. A copy of the war diary will be furnished to any commander desiring it.

The Mission of Task Force 58 was to prevent interference by enemy air action with the capture of OKINAWA to protect the Joint Fxpeditionary Force and OKINAWA after occupation by our landing force, from attack by enemy surface forces; and to conduct air strikes on the EMPIRE, FORMOSA and NANSEI SHOTO, in order to support the capture and occupation of OKINAWA.

The operations of the U.S.S. OAKLAND were governed by the following operation orders during this period:

Commander FIFTH Fleet Top Secret Operation Order No. 1-45 dated 3 January 1945.

Commander Task Force FIFTY-EIGHT Top Secret Operation Order No. A4-3 dated 1 March 1945,

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point FOUR Top Secret Operation Order (Not received)

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point Two Top Secret Operation Order No. D2-45 (corrections of 6 April 1945)

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point THREE, Top Secret Operation Order No. 5-45 dated 11 March 1945.

D, A brief mention of the position and disposition of own task group during the actions reported on is included in Part III.

E. The only enemy forces encountered were Japanese aircraft.

Part III. Chronological Account.

The routine operations of the U.S.S. OAKLAND are covered in detail in the War Diary and Ship's Log. In addition, the Action Reports of the following task group conumnders of Task Force 58 will reveal details of the operations the task groups to which the OAKLAND was attached during the periods stated below:

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point FOUR - 3 to 6 April 1945, 

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point TWO - 7 to 10 April 1945. 

Commander Task Group FIFTY-EIGHT point THREE- 10 April to 27 May 1945.

In order to avoid duplication of reports, ccmplete chronological accounts are submitted only for the periods during which the OAKLAND took enemy aircraft under fire.

11 APRIL 1945 (Time Zone -9) 

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1110 - Upon receiving a report from Commander Task Force 58 that enemy had ordered an attack on this force Commander Task Group 58.3 changed cruising disposition from 5-Roger to 5-victor. Formation axis is 355deg, OAKLAND occupying station 3.5180. Formation course is 350 deg Formation speed is eighteen knots. WEATHER: - Broken skies in late morning as a cold front passed. Ceiling 2000 - 3000 feet to unlimited later in the day with scattered stratocumulus and cumulus clouds. Wind averaged twenty knots from the north. Visibility five miles in the morning to ten miles in the afternoon.

1111 - U.S.S. OAKLAND went to General Quarters. Low flying bogies reported in the vicinity by air patrols. Increased number of radar "flash" bogey contact reports noted on Inter Fighter Director Officer circuit. 

1129 - Report received that enemy planes were shot down near Task Group
 
58.40 bearing 045deg. 

1131 - Set Condition of Readiness One-Easy. 

1137 - Formation course changed into the wind and carriers commenced
 
launching and landing operations. 

1143-Changod course to 150deg. 

1200 - Position; Latitude 260deg 41' North; Longitude- 130deg 00'East. 

1220 - Changed formation ccurse to 355deg and resumed aircraft operations. 

1303 - Commenced zigzagging in accordance with plan number six. 

1306 - Set Condition of Readiness Three. 

1325 - Changed formation disposition from 5-Victor to 5-Roger.

1333 - Radar "flash" bogey reports and increase in fighter reports indicated possibility of enemy planes in the vicinity. 

1348 - Changed cruising disposition from 5-Roger to 5- Victor. 

1350 - Increased formation speed to twenty-five knots. 

1351 - Set Condition One on all guns, plot, C.I.C. and Directors. 

1355 - Commenced maneuvering by 'Emergency Turn" signals. 

1401 - Changed speed to twenty-one knots.

1405 - accuted "Emergency Turn Nine" - new course 165deg.

1405 - Sounded General Quarters.

1406 - Enemy- planes reported bearing 100deg, distance eight miles. 

1407 - Judy sighted closing from the west. 

1407 - U.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing to starboard at Judy closing from 275deg. Enemy planes sighted also bearing 100deg distance 6 1/2 miles. Planes to the east observed to turn away.

1407 - Formation course clanged to 085deg. 

1408 - U.S.S. OAKLAND ceased firing, having expanded 23 rounds of 5"/38 caliber VT fuzed AA common projectiles. This plane crashed in flames inside the formation. 

1408 - Window observed in area of diversionary attack bearing 104deg, distance 6 1/2 miles. 

1410 - Topside observers report two planes shot down by anti-air-craft fire. One attempted to dive on carrier - missed by about three hundred feet. 

1411 - Radar contact lost on target, but window remained. Bogey contact made, bearing 09deg, distance eleven miles. 

1411 - Formation course changed to 345deg. 

1411 - Formation speed changed to twenty-five knots. 

1411 - Bandit sighted close to formation - shot down by Task Group astern of U.S.S. ENTERPPISE (CV-6). Attempted to dive on carrier, missed by about five hundred feet. Window observed from direction of attacking plane bearing 030deg distance five miles. 

1412 - Changed Formation course to 265deg. 

1414 - Report received via TBS that U.S.S. KIDD (DD- 661) had been hit by enemy suicide plane. Bandit sighted bearing 030deg 5 miles. 

1415 - Changed course to 265deg. Jap plane shot down by gunfire and seen to crash near U.S.S. PASADENA (CL-65) then on this ships starboard quarter. Continued maneuvering radically as Jap planes continued to be reported within close range of formation. 

1443 - Observed Task Group 58.4 to be under attack on starboard quarter. 

1444 - Carriers launching and recovering patrols. 

1447 - Report received that three groups of bogies were closing, between 270deg and 300deg. distance thirty- five miles.

1450 - Changed formation speed to twenty-three knots. 

1454 - Bogies reported 220deg, distance thirty miles - estimated eight to ten planes.

1455 - Changed formation course to 090deg. 

1500 - Bogey reported on starboard side of this formation. 

1500 - Friendly fighters flow out in direction of bogey and attempted-interception at close range. 

1500 - Three enemy planes sighted approaching the formation at high speed. 

1500 - A Judy, sighted in steep dive coming down on formation from the west, leveled off over this ship and circled into formation. Second one chased by F6F flew on to the east - did not attack.

1500 - U.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing to starboard against the Judy. 

1500 - Formation course changed to 270deg.

1501 - Judy passed directly over this ship about five hundred feet altitude. 

1501 - U.S.S. OAKLAND ceased firing.

1501- - Judy released bomb - probably intended for the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE, and crashed several hundred yards from that ship then on our starboard quarter.

1501 - Fire sighted on the flight deck of the U.S.S. ENTERPRISE. 

1503 - Flaming plane, type unknown jettisoned by U.S.S. ENTERPRRISE.

1504 - Formation course changed to 090deg. 

1506 - Formation course changed to 180deg. 

1506 - Bogie reported bearing 270deg - ten miles from this formation. 

1507 - U.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing to starboard. 

1508 - U.S.S. OAKLAND ceased firing. having expended 316 rounds of 40MM and 804 rounds of 2OMM amunition since 1500, Judy shot down about one thousand feet astern of this vessel. 

1508 Observed what appeared to be hole made by a 20MM projectile in number
one stack. Believed this last plane may have been strafing while making final
approach. 

1509 - Formation course changed tr 270deg. 

1509 - Bogie reported bearing 090deg.

1511 - Formation course changed to 090deg. 

1513 - Observed U.S.S ESSEX apparently under attack. 

1514 - Plane idontified as F6F - Formation ceased fire. 

1515 - U.S.S. OAKLAND reported sighting parachute in water off port bow to Commander Task Group 58.3. 

1515 - Formation course changed to 180deg. Bogie reported bearing 340deg distance ten miles. 

1520 - Formation course changed to 090deg. 

1521 - Commander Task Force 58 reported that Jap Coordinator was talking to another plane, probably a new attack group. 

1525 - Formation course: Changed to 180deg. 

1525 - Report received that bogies are closing formation. 

1526 - Formation course changed to 270deg. 

1526 - Previously reported bogies now bearing 330deg distance eight miles.

1526 - Task Group 58.3 comenced firing. 

1529 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE observed to be leaving large oil slick. 

1531 - Formation speed changed to twenty-knots. 

1536 - U.S.S. KIDD (DD-661) escorted to the formation by Destroyer Division
 
96 returning from destroyer scouting line.

1542 - Commander Task Force 58 reported that the Japanese had changed
 
co-ordinator and now had four planes on station. 

1545 - U.S.S. ENTERPRISE reported that her damage was superficial. 

1545 - U.S.S. KIDD because of limited speed available ordered to proceed to the South.

1610 - Formation course changed to 000deg. 

1611 - Bogic reported bearing 185deg distance fifteen miles, closing.

1611 - Formation speed changed to twenty-three knots.

1615 - Formation course changed to 030deg. 

1622 - Commander Task Group 58.3 reported that the Japanese are going to deliver an all out air attack today and tomrrow, with everything they have. 

1627 - Formation speed changed to twenty knots. 

1630 - bogie reported bearing 205deg distance fifteen miles. 

1631 - Bogie now reported bearing 210deg distance ten miles. 

1633 - Observed another Task Group on our port side to be firing. 

1636 - Formation changed course to 000deg. 

1638 - Zeke reported at 190deg, low on the water closing. 

1645 - Judy reported bearing 290deg distance nine miles, believed to have been target of other group. 

1647 - Observed another Task Group on starboard quarter to be firing. 

1647 - Bogie roported bearing 210deg distance four miles, believed to be Zeke previously reported in that area. 

1707 - Task Group 58.3 commenced firing at bogie bearing 280deg distance ten miles., identified as a Zeke. 

1707 - Formation course changed to 300deg. 

1708 - Formation course changed to 240deg.

1708 - Observed Zeke to be shot down in flames ahead of the formation, distance about five thousand yards, from about two thousand feet altitude.

1731 - Commander Task Force 58 reported that Japs have ordered an attack on
 
us at 1900, 

1736 - Changed tormtion course to 180deg. Changed formation speed to
 
twenty-seven knots. 

1751 - U.S.S. ENTERPRISE reported that her damage caused by strating and near miss. 

1806 - Commander Task Force 58 reported that one Jap plane said he would arrive at 1900, another at 1920. 

1838 - Changed formation speed to twenty-five knots. 

1841 - Darkened ship. 

1842 - Report received that CAP splashed two Betties bearing 126deg distance fifty-two miles. 

1846 - Bogie reported bearing 120deg, distance thirty miles, closing. 

1850 - Task Group Commander directed ships to jam ak, discretion. 

1856 - Observed plapo to be shot down on bearing 090deg.

1858 - Two raids reported to have been contacted: one at 170deg, distance twenty-eight miles; other at 073deg, distance fourteen miles .

1904 - Bogie at bearing 124deg distance eighteen miles reported Tally Hoed by
 
VF(N).

1907 - Formation course changed to 355deg.

1908 - Observed Task Group 58.4 to be firing, All bogies now in this vicinity. 

1909 - Commander Task Force 58 reported that Japanese had been ordered to make an attack. 

1912 - Raids four and five closing.

1914 - Raid at 180deg distance thirty miles reported to be splitting. 

1914 - Formation course changed to 175deg. 

1918 - Raid Five now bearing 162deg distance twenty-two railes. 

1920 - Task Group 58.4 observed to have shot down enemy plane. 

1920 - Formation course changed to 215deg. 

1925 - Formation course changed to 245deg. 

1926 - All raids now reported to be opening. Windowobserved bearing 213deg distance seven miles. 

1927 - Raids now closing front five to -seven miles distant. 

1927 - Commander Task Force 58 reports that enemy planes ordered to drop flares.

1927 - Ships of Task Group 58.3 to starboard observed to be firing at raid new bearing 130deg distance eight miles from this ship. Window observed bearing 120deg distance- twenty miles.

1929 - Fornation course changed to 195deg.

1936 - Connander Task Force 58 reports that Jap attack leader said he was at six thousand feet and had ordered other planes to drop flares. 

1939 - Sighted flares to port at considerable distance from the formation. 

1948 - Bogie picked up bearing 245deg distance fourteen miles, closing.

1950 - Dogie now bearing 240deg distance five rniles. 

1950 - U.S.S. OAKLAND comonced firing to starboard. 

1950 - Formation course changed to 155deg. 

1951 - U.S.S, OAKLAND ceased firing, having expended 59 rounds of 5" 38 caliber AA comon projoctiles. 

1952 - Group of bogies contacted bearing 040deg distance twenty miles and 213deg distance twenty-three miles.

1958 - Bogie now bearing 020deg distance five miles.

1958 - Task Group 58.3 comenced firing.

1959 - Formation changed course to 165deg. 

1959 - U,.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing. 

2000 - U.S.S. OAKIAND ceased firing having expended 36 rounds of 5" 38 caliber AA common projectiles. 

2000 - Position: Latitude 26deg 59' North; Longitude 129deg 57'East. 

2001 - Three casualties reported-at nunmber six 40MM mount,. Report indicated that two men seriously injured, one man slightly.

2006 U.S.S. ENTERPRISE reported receiving two 5" hits on her port side - no casualties.

2006 - Three casualties at number Six40MM mount reported to be: 

WALKER, William Louis, 379 29 37, S2c, USN - suffered extreme multiple injuries; died twenty minutes after accident occured. 

WALL, Wentworth George,, 888 32 02, S2c, USNR, loader, suffered extreme multiple injuries; died throe minutes after the accident occured. 

ALLARD, George Sherwood, 643 92 40, S2c, USNR, loader; suffered fracture, simple, left ulna.

Those men were crushed in between gun munt and gun shield when the mount slowed radically when directors were changed. 

2017 - Formation speed changed to twenty- one knots. 

2021 - Gunfire observed on horizon at 300deg. 

2023 - Formation course changed to 000deg,speed eighteen knots.

2036 - Commander Task Force 58 reported, "The last Jap said he is going home. His relief came back and said he was going home too. I guess he saw your
 
anti-aircraft fire."

2037 - Commander Task Group 58.3 ordered Condition Three set. 

2037 - Secured from General Quarters; set condition of readiness three.

16 APRIL 1945 (Time Zone -9)

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1828 - U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL-95) on station 3330 in Task Group 58.3 cruising disposition 5-Roger, formation axis 010deg, formation course 005deg, formation speed twenty-three knots. Carriers in process of recovering of day patrols and launching VF(N).

WEATHER: Scattered cumulus clouds on the, horizon. Ceiling unlimited.
 
Visibility over ten miles. Wind from 330deg force fourteen knots. Sea smooth. 

1828 -U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL-95) manned all gun stations, plot, directors and C.I.C. with condition one crows for evening alert. 

1842 - Formation axis changed to 010deg Formation speed changed to twenty-one knots.

1842 - C.I.C. reported a bogie bearing 308deg distance thirty-six miles. 

1843 - U.S.S. OAKLAND darkened ship.

1845 - Bogie previously reported now bearing 295deg distance twenty-three miles, closing. This raid designated as Raid One* 

1847 - Commander Task Group 58.3 ordered Condition One set on all
 
Anti-Aircraft batteries. This ship noted an increase in the numbcr of "flash" bogie reports received over inter fighter director reporting circuit. Enemy planes believed to be in the vicinity.

1852 Raid One now bearing 227deg distance twelve miles, altitude reported to be seven thousand feet. 

1853 - U.S.S. OAKLAND (CL-95) sounded General Quarters. 

1853 - Raid One now bearing 217deg distance eight miles. 

1855 - Observed ships of our task group to be firing on starboard quarter at Raid One.

1855 - Visual contact established on Raid One. Identified as a Francis, now in a long glide. 

1856 - U.S.S. OAKLAND commented firing on Raid One now bearing 215deg distance six miles. 

1856 - Formation course changed to the right to 125deg. 

1857 - U.S.S. OAKLAND ceased firing, having expended 50 rounds 5" 38 caliber AA common. Raid One observed to burst into flames. OAKLAND claims to have assisted in the destruction of this plane.

1857 - Parachute sighted descending behind the flaming Fraricis.

1858 - Raid Ono crashed in flames just inside of the formation screen.

1858 - U.S.S. ERBEN detached to recover Jap survivor seen to parachute. 

1900 - Formation course changed to 005deg. 

1903 - Formation speed changed to sixteen knots.

1905 - Fornation course changed to 350deg.

1909 - Bogie reported to the Northeast distance twenty-five miles. 

1918 - Formation course changed to 150deg. Formation speed changed to
 twenty-one knots. 

1922 - Friendly VF.(N) reported to be chasing bogie to the Northeast.

1925 - Observed Task Group 58.4 to be firing to the Southeast. 

1928 - Bogie now bearing 080deg distance thirtoon miles. (Also designated as
 
Raid One).

1929 - Formation course changed to 180deg. 

1930 Ships of Task Group 58.3 commenced firing on Raid One. 

1931 - Raid One now bearing 070deg distance seven miles. 

1931 U.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing.

1931 Raid One reported to be a Betty, although too dark for positive
 
identification.

1932 U.S.S. OAKLAND checked fire.

1933 - U.S.S. OAKLAND resumed fire.

1934 - U.S.S. OAKLAND ceased fire, having expendod 197 rounds of 5" 38 caliber AA common projectiles. 

1935 - Changed formation course to 135deg. 

1935 - Raid One now bearing 033deg distance seven miles, retiring. 

1940 - Commander Task Force 58 reported, "That another Jap plane has arrived in the battle area," 

2000 - Position: Latitude 27deg 44' North; Longitude 130deg 36' East*.

2006 - Task Group Commander ordered Condition Ono easy on all Anti-Aircraft batteries.

2011 - U.S.S. WALKER in Northeast picket station reported she had been the target of a torpedo attack - results negative.

2040 - Commnder Task Force 58 reportod, "There are two groups of enemv planes in the area, one group is supposed to be here at 2040."

2045 - U.S.S. OAKLAND sounded General Quarters. 

2047 - Commander Task Force 58 reported, "Enemy planes have sightod us and the third group has been ordered to attack us." 

2055 - Sighted Task Group 58.4 firing on the horizon. 

2056 - Bogies reported bearing 218deg distance tvienty-one miles. 

2058 - Commander Task Force 58 ordered "Ships to jam at discretion.

2100 - Commander Task Force reported, Another attack signal has been given.'' 

2102 - Formation course now 050deg.

2102 - Bogie reported bearing 105deg distance sixteen miles, closing.

2102 - Ships of this task group firing off starboard bow. 

2104 - Commander Task Force 58 reported,"The Jap co-ordinator is insisting
 
upon an attack."

2105 - Bogie previously, reported now bearing 095deg distance ten miles. 

2105 - This bogie now observed to open rapidly to the Northeast in the direction of Task Group 58.3 picket U.S.S. WALKER (DD-517). 

2106 - Another bogie reported to the west bearing 230deg distance nine miles. 

2106 - Bogie opening to the east appeared to drop flares inuminating the formation, for bogie now approaching from the west. Co-ordimtod attack was probably planned. 

2106 - Ships of this task group open fire on bogie, to the west, now bearing 237deg distance eight miles.

2106 - Bogie to the Southwost observed to drop flares and retire to the north. 

2112 - Ships of this task group resume fire on bogie to the west now on northerly course.

2118 - Ships of this task group ceased firing. 

2120 - Largo quantities of window observed bearing 260deg distance twelve
 
miles.

2146 - U.S.S. OAKLAND secured from General Quarters.

17 APRIL 1945 (Time Zone -9)

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0829 - Task Croup 58.3 conunenced forming cruising disposition Victor,
 
formation axis 010deg, OAKLAND occupying station 3338. Task Group 58.3 on fomation course 040deg at formation speed tventy-six knots.

WEATHER: Scattered altocumulus and cumulus clouds,, slight amount of cirrocumulus. Ceiling unlimited. Visibility eight to twelve miles. Wind slight and variable from northerly direction. Sea calm with slight swell.

0905 - Formation course changed to 040deg. Formation speed changed to
 twenty-five knots.

0917 - Sighted plane crash bearing 030deg identity unknown. 

0918 - Bogies reported in the immediate vicinity over Inter Fighter Director
 
circuit, closing. 

0918 - Formation course changed to 080deg by emergency turn signal.

0942 - Received report that friendly fighter was down, presumed to be plane crash previously sighted. 

0924 - Formation course changed to 170deg.

0925 - Formation course changed to 260deg.

0926 - Report received that bogies wore closing the formation from the north. 

0926 - Sounded General Quarters.

0926 - Kate sighted visually on starboard beam, heading directly for this ship.

0927 - OAKLAND opened fire on the attacking Kate. Primary weapons against this attack were the 4OMM and 20MM batteries.

0927 - OAKLAND ceased firing, Hits observed by this ships' guns. Kate passed over the stern of this ship and crashed on our port quarter. OAKLAND claims an "assist" in destruction of this plane. Ammunition expended: 150 rounds of 40MM ammunition; 804 rounds of 20MM ammunition. 

0928 - Formation course changed to 340deg by emergency turn signals.

0928 - Report received that DAVIS, Leland Korr, 570 20 56, GM3c USNR, had received shrapnel wounds on his left arm, evidently resulting from the explosion of a 20MM projoctile which hit near him. 

0930 - Another bogie reported bearing 000deg distance ten miles, closing. 

0930 - Formtion course changed to 090deg.

0930 - Report received from topside observers that a plane was observed to be shot down on the other side of the formation.

0930 - Position: Latitude 26deg 57' North, Longitude 129deg 55' East. 

0930 - Noticed a 5" shell to splash and burst off the port- quarter about one hundred yards away. 

0932 - Formation course changed to 170deg.

0932 - Bogie reported to be bearing 350deg distance eight miles, closing. 

0934 - Formation course changed to 260deg.

0936 - OAKLAND commence firing to starboard at Zeke making surprise attack from northeast, range about 4000 yards.

0936 - OAKLAND ceased firing. Ammunition expended, 4 rounds of 5" 38 Caliber; 112 rounds of 40MM.

0937 - Observed Zeke which had been fired upon crash on the port quarter of the BATAAN. Zeke had approached in a glide from the northeast and had released bombs directed at the ESSEX. He than climbed and after gaining a little more altitude attempted a suicide dive on the BATAAN, missing astern.

29 APRIL 1945 (Time Zone -9)

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1645 - Task Group 58-3.was in cruising disposition 5-Victor, formation axis 090deg, OAKLAND occupying station 3180. Formation course was 100deg and formation speed was 15 knots. Heavy ships of the task group were engaged in topping off destroyers with fuel oil. Task Group 58.4 operating in the vicinity had been under air attack and was reported to have shot down three Japanese aircraft about 1627.

WEATHER: The sky was partly cloudy,, with scattered cumulus clouds and a
light blanket of cirrus clouds. Surface visibility was excellent. The wind was from
060deg, force 7 knots. The sea was smooth with low swells. 

1647 - All destroyers not engaged in fueling operations ordered to take 5-Victor stations. Bogie contact reported 346deg distance-twenty-two miles. 

1655 - Bogic now 320deg distance twelve miles, course South. 

1655 - U.S.S. OAKLAND went to General Quarters. 

1656 - Destroyers ceased "topping off" operations, proceeded to 5 Victor stations. 

1657 - Formation course changed to 190deg, 

1700 - Position : Latitude 26deg 41' North, Longitude 329deg 48' East.

1701 - Observed Task Group 58.4 to be firing - now bearing 025deg. 

1704 - Bogie now 320deg distance eight miles. Report received that U.S.S. HAGGARD (DD-555) had been hit by suicider while on linking vessel duty. Formation speed changed to 25 knots.

1707 - Formaition course changed to 100deg. Bogie now reported at 310deg distance fifteen miles. Commander Task Group 58 ordered Commander Task Group 58.3 to send a division of destroyers to aid the USS HAGGARD (DD-555) had been hit by suicider while on linking vessel duty.

1709 Bogic now reported at 270deg distance fifteen miles.-reported to be at high altitude angels twenty-eight. 

1710 - Formation course changed to 190deg.

1711 - Bogie now reported at 270deg distance ten miles. 

1712 - Task Group Commander ordered commence firing by those ships having solution.

1712 - U.S.S. OAKLAND commenced firing to starboard ship's head 190deg throughout firing. Bogie never sighted by this ship. After fire opened by this ship radical change in bogie's course observed - clearing this formation. U.S.S. OAKLAND only ship firing. 

1713 - Bogie changed course to 045deg - now bearing 2900 distance 4 1/2 miles. 

1714 - Bogic now retiring to the North - now 325deg distance five miles. U.S.S. OAKIAND ceased firing, having expanded 41 rounds 5" 38 caliber AA common amunition.

1715 - Formation course changed to 280deg. 

1717 - Formation course changed to 010deg. ComDesDiv 104 with HUNT, MARSHALL, HANCOCK and WALKER detached and sent to aid the crippled HAGGARD.

1723 - Formation course changed to 330deg. 

1748 - Commander Task Group 58,3 reported "all clear". 

1756 - USS OAKLAND secured from General Quarters.

11 MAY 1945 (Time Zone -9)

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1010 The OAKLAND was in station 3.5231 of Task Group 58.3 cruising disposition 5-Victor# formation axis 235deg.. The formation course was 050deg, formation speed twenty-one knots. The ship was in condition three, Task Group 58.4 in the vicinity had shot down a Myrt at 0915, and the rondezvous destroyers had splashed a Tojo at 0930. 

WEATHER: Broken overcast sky, ceiling about 3,000 f6et,, with eirrocumulus, alto-cumulus and stratocumlus. Surface visibility was excellent (about fifteen miles). The wind was southerly about five knots. The sea was smooth. 

1011 - OAKLAND went to General Quarters, BUNKER HILL (cV-17) in station 2.5288 was hit by two Japanese suicide planes. Formation course changed to the right to 140deg. The first suicider approached in a shallow dive of about 20deg at moderate speed from the starboard beam of BUNKER HILL, passing over the screen and hitting the carrier's flight deck about amidships. An explosion and serious flight deck fire resulted. The second plane came in about fifteen or twenty seconds later. It also approached from the starboard beam of the BUNKER HILL and appeared to be in almost level flight at about 1500 feet altitude when it banked and dove on the carrier from astern. Viewed from ahead the dive appeared almost vertical, although the diving speed was not excessive. This second plane crashed among aircraft spotted aft on the BUNKER HILL and the entire after half of the flight deck and the after third of the hangar deck were immediately enveloped in intense flame. This plane was taken under meagor fire by the BUNKER HILL
 
and possibly by a nearby ship., and burst into flames about 200 foot above its target. Shipboard observers thought both of the above planes were Zekes and stated that one was painted silver. Others in the task groups identified one of these planes a Grace a new type Japamse torpedo plane. This attack was a complete surprise. No radar bogie had been made concerning theseplanes. A considerable number of returning strike planes were in the vicinity. These Japanese planes may have carried IFF. The patchy stratocumulus clouds provided a propitious
condition for a sneak attack when radar screens are cluttered with friendly aircraft.

1012 -Increased formation speed to twenty-five knots. 

1014 WILKES-BARR, E. CHARLES, S. SPERRY, ENGLISH, and STEMBEL ordered to standby BUNKER HILL. Dogie reported 090deg , -10 high closing. 

1016 - Formation course changed to the left to 050deg. WALDRON commenced rescuing survivors of BUNKER HILL from the water. 

1018 - Another bogie reported at 1300 - 20 closing. Task Group 58.4 is
 
now-operating to the southeast.

1020 - A group gf enemy planes were engaged by four picket destroyers bearing about 140deg and by friendly fighters which were reported to have shot down two of them.

1023 - A Zele with a F6F in hot pursuit approached the formation from the southeast.

1024 - The Zeke turned toward the Task Group 58.3 formation and commenced
 
a glide attack aiming for the BUNKER HILL. AULT and WILKES-BARRE opened fire and the F6F veered away. Task Group 58.3 changed course to the right to 140deg.

1025 - The Zeke was hit by the fire of other ships and crashed near the AULT bearirig 220deg distance 2,000 yards from OAKLAND. Emergency ships right to 230deg. 

1026 - Bogie bearing 170deg distance ten miles, opening, 

1027 - Chinttod formation course to the right to 320deg to keep BUNKER HILL in the formation. OAKLAND maneuvered to maintain approximate station while endeavoring to provide BUNKER HILL with maximum anti-aircraft protection. 

1030 - Position: Latitude 25deg 57' North; Longitude 129deg 06' East,

14 May 1945 (Time Zone -9)

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0630 OAKLAND occupying station 3.5231 in Task Group 58.3 cruising disposition 5-Victor, formation axis 285deg formation was on course 135deg at speed twenty-five knots. Task Group 58.1 was in the vicinity. Both task groups were engaged in striking KYUSHU and SHIKOKU targets for a second consecutive day.

WEATHER: At 0700 the sky was 80% covered with eirrocumulus, airrostratuis, alto- cumulus and cumulus clouds,, with scattered lower clouds at about 3,000 feet. Surface visibility was excellent. Winds light and variable from southeast. Sea smooth with very little smell. At 0830 the thick alto- cumulus clouds had increased and the ceiling was about 10,000 feet, - with 30% stratocumulus at 5,000 feet. 

0633 - HUNT (DD-674) detached to pick up and search body of Jap reported by SPRINGFIELD (CL66). 

0634 - Bogie reported at 330deg distance twenty miles on south- easterly course. Another bogie reported at 135deg distance eighteen miles. 

0635 - Task Group 58.1 reported splashing one-enemy plane.

0635 - Bogie now 140deg distance fourteen miles identified by friendly as a Zeke.

0638 - Friendly and Zeke merged to the southeast. 

0642 - Friendly to southeast reported no longer with Zeke. 

0642 - Comenced maneuvering by emergency turn signals.

0650 - Plane reported to be Zeke now bearing 150deg distance eleven miles. 

0652 - Zeke now reported bearing 100deg distance nine miles, heading northwest.

0653 Bogie previously reported to Northwest on southerly course now bearing 250deg distance ten miles, believed to be coming left and closing.

0655 - Bogie reported now bearing 230deg distance seven miles. OAKLAND
 
went to General Quarters. The enemy plane was approaching at about 3,000 feet altitude taking advantage of cloud cover.

0656 - OAKLAND opened fire on starboard quarter. The enemy plane was sighted momentarily through a break in the clouds many friendlies in the area. Formation course now 075deg.

0657 - 0AKLAND ceased firing. The enemy plane was then in the clouds over the formation. Formation course changed to the left to 345deg. 

0658 - ENTERPRISE (CV-6) hit bv suicide Zeke on forward part of the flight deck, causing an immediate explosion. Flames were seen to spread over the flight and hanger decks. ENTERPRISE (CV-6) then on our port quarter. 

0659 - Formation course changed to 255deg. 

0701 - WALDRON (DD-699) detached to rescue survivors from ENTERPRISE. 

0701 - Formation course changed to 165deg.

0703 - CAP reported a Val coming in from the north, enemy failed to materialize. 

0704 - Task Group 58.1 reported splashing one Zeke near their formation. 

0707 - Emergency turn to 075deg, ENTERPRISE reported hit had been in
 
number one elevator. 

0710 - Bogies to northwest closed to ten miles, now bearing 355deg distance twenty-one miles, friendlies after him.

0711 - Changed formation course to 1650.

0713 - ENTERPRISE reports success in fighting fire. 

0714 - Emergency turn to 225deg. Our strike Picket at 045deg distance
 
twenty-five miles reported many bogies high over them. Bogie reported bearing 135deg distance eighteen miles closing. 

0715 - Emergency turn to 285deg.

0717 - Baridit splashed twenty miles to southwest, identified as a Zeke, 

0718 - Emergency turn to 315deg,

0721 - Emergency turn to 045deg.

0721 - ENTERPRISE reports fires under control.

0724 - Emergency turn to 135deg. Bogie reported bearing 030deg distance twelve miles. Splashed by RANDOLPH plane, one Zekes Strike pickets report a melee over them. 

0730 - Received report that Commander Task Force 58 would move to RANDOLPH (CV-15).

0731 - Bogie reported bearing 260deg distance forty-two miles. 

0735 - BATAAN fighters tally-hood and splashed one Tony at that range and bearing.

0738.- WALDRON reported picking up eight survivors from ENTERPRISE.

0740 - Bogie reported beqring 160deg distance thirty miles, closing on a westerly course friendlies nearby intercepting. 

0742 - Emergency turn to 045deg , Bogie.now bearing 165deg distance
 
twenty-two miles, course 290deg designated as Raid Eight.

0744 - Emergency turn to 315deg, Two Zekes splashed bearing 210deg distance fifteen miles by friendly CAP.

0746 - Observed column of smoke at 203deg about fifteen miles. 

0750 - OAKLAND secured from General Quarters. Changed course to 045deg. Changed speed to 25 knots.

0752 - OAKLAND changed course to 060deg. 

0757 - OAKLAND changed course to 120deg. 

0758 - Changed formation course to 180deg. 

0800 - Position: Lat. 30deg39'N. Long. 132deg 58'E. 

0800 - Several bogies probably part of Raid Eight, reported closing from the cast. OAKLAND went to General Quarters. OAKLAND commenced firing all batteries to port at enemy plane approaching Task Group 58.3 from the East in a glide. OAKLAND was heading about 140deg, swinging right to new course 180deg. 

0801 - OAKLAND ceased firing. 

0802 - Zeke hit and splashed astern of ESSEX, 

0804 - Formation course changed to 090deg. 

0805 - Zeke sighted almost dead ahead, making glide attack directed at ESSEX. OAKLAND on heading about 150deg swinging left to new course 090deg. Commenced firing 40MM, battery. 

0806 - OAKLAND ceased firing. 

0807 - Bandit identified as Zeke beginning to flame, passed close aboard and crashed on starboard quarter of ESSEX, apparently only about fifty feet clear. 0AKLAND claims assisting in destruction of this Plane. 

0810 - Formation course changed to 270deg. 

0812 - Bandit to west reported closing. OAKLAND commenced firing all batteries at a Zeke making a glide attack on Task Group 58.3 carriers from 080deg.
 
Another bogie reported to southwest. 

0813 - 0AKLAND ceased firing. This Zcke was shot down on starboard quarter just as it penetrated screen, splashing near the. MONTEREY. OAKLAND claims assisting in the destruction of this plane.

0813 - Bogie to southeast now at 200deg distance seven miles opening to the west. 

0815 - Formation course changed to 010deg. Japanese plane sighted on starboard quarter high, identified as Zeke making a glide attack. OAKLAND commenced firing, five inch and 40mm batteries on true bearing about 075deg at range
 
between 8000 and 6000 yards. 

0816 - Zeke crashed just abaft starboard beam, outside screen. 0AKLAND ceased firing., having expendod the following ammunition against Japanese aircraft attacking between 0655 and 0816: 13 projectiles 5" 38 Caliber AA, Common,
 Fuze Mk. 18-3. 95 projectiles 5" 38 Caliber AA Common, Fuze 53-1. 108 cartridges 5" 38 Caliber power. 934 rounds 40MM ammunition.1150 rounds 20mm ammunition.

Part IV - Ordnance 

1. Ammunition expended in action during the period of this report.

5" 38 cal. AA Common, VT fuzed - 357 rounds 

5" 38 cal. AA Common, Uk. 18 fuzed - 274 rounds 

40 MM HEITSD - 1731 rounds 

20 MM HEI - 1989 rounds 

20 MM HET - 987 rounds

2. When sneak enemy attacks are made, as they generally are, while large
 
numbers of friendlies are within 30 or 40 thousand yards of the task group, the following factors tend to confuse and nullify the effectiveness of radar fire control.

(1) Dispersal of friendlies over a broad bearing and range band, combined with poor bearing discrimination of BU IFF.

(2) Interceptions in progress within thirty or forty thousand yards. 

(3) Absence of interrogation equipment in fire control radars.

(4) Complexity, variability, and multiplicity of friendly aircraft approach procedures, failure of friendly aircraft to observe specified procedures, combined with the burden of positive recognition imposed in practice upon anti-aircraft personnel.

Part V - Battle Damage to Enemy Units

1. At 1856 on 16 April 1945 a Japanese twin-engined bomber (FRANCES) was shot down in flames, this ship being among the many firing, 5"/38 cal. tracers
 
from this ship were followed to a bursting point in the immediate vicinity of the target at the time it burst into flames.

2. At 0926 on 17 April 1945 a Japanese torpedo plane (KATE) passing close aboard this ship in a suicide dive on the RANDOLPH was taken under fire by the machine gun battery of this ship. Numerous hits were observed, one wing was severed) and the plane crashed in flames.

3. At 0805 on 14, May 1945 a Japanese suicide plant (ZEKE) passing close
 
aboard this ship in a dive on the ESSEX was taken under fire by 40 MM mount No. 2 of this ship. Hits were observed, and the plane crashed in flames.

4. At 0812 on 14 May 1945 a Japanese suicide plane was shot dom in flames, this ship being among the many firing. 5"/38 cal. tracers from this ship were followed to a bursting point in the immediate vicinity of the target at the time it burst into flames.

Part VI - Special Comments and Information A. IFF Performance

1. The poor directional characteristics of the BM made identifies cation of planes extremely difficult on this cruise. The bearing width of the IFF response on a
 
single target was observed to be 20 degrees either side at 60 miles and broadening to 100 degrees on either side at 10 miles. Picking a single bogey out of a group of friendlies in close was almost impossible.

2. Whenever bogies werc believed to be in the vicinity, friendlies were vectored in their general direction. They, together with those friendlies at almost the samc range but in another quadrantcovered the "A" scope with friendly indications. The number of these indications almost nullified any hope we might have had of tracking the bogic.

3. From a material standpoint the BM operated exceptionally well and it was possible to track planes at great distances by its use alone. If a plane was friendly, but had weak lights, we were always confident of picking up his IFF.

4. During one emergency, when our BM was out of commission, we found it possible to distinguish between a bogio and a friendly night fighter by triggering
 
our BN occasionally. The bogie on this occasion closed to six miles before it was splashed. Although both bandit and friendly were close together and faded occasionally our BN kept us informed and when the bandit exploded it was seen by the director personnel who were "on" target.

B. Unusual Range Performances of Radar

1. A largo number of unusual -occurences in the fields of Radar., Radio, and CIC were observed on this cruise. They took the form of phenomenal ranges on surface and air search radars, extreme ranges on very high frequency radio, increased number of fades on the air search radar and unusual contacts including the "Ghost of Nansei Shoto". This ship has operated in almost all of the area covered by our Pacific offensive and has yet to observe another area. Where the frequency of such unusual conditions exists. A mor'e intimate knowledge of these conditions, and their "effect upon very high frequency radar and radio might explain in part the degree of Japanese success in obtaining complete or partial evasion of our radar.

2. At 2100 on the evening of 17 May while operating with Task Group 58.3 in
 
the, vicinity of Latitude 25deg 2l.7'N, Longitude 130deg 11'E extreme ranges were noted on search radars.

3. The Southern tip of Amami was contacted on the SR radar bearing 3400, 175 miles. The SG(A)-radar tracked two destroyers at ranges exceeding 31 miles. The strength of these echoes was observed to be E4 and E5 similar to those then being obtained on destroyers in the screen at 10,000 yards.

4. This unusual condition persisted until 0200 18 May. Shortly after midnight the SR radar picked up a dry target at 000deg, 310 miles. This was believed to have been the island of Yaku Shima just south of Kyushu. The SG(A) radar obtained second and third sweep echoes on land with saturated pipe between 70 and 120 miles.

5. At 2000 on 18 May the same phenomena occured -while steaming in Latitude 25deg 38'N Longitude 129deg 38'E. -Aircraft on anti-submarine patrol were continuously tracked at ranges of 60,000 yards on the SG(A). At 2030 Okinawa was contacted on the SG(A) with mean bearing of 3000, Saturated land targets were observed 10 to 150 on either side of this bearing with depth about 10 miles. The ranges wore all between 110 and 125 miles.

6. At 2030 the SR picked up land at 0080, 300 miles and at 0040., 260 miles. The first target when plotted appeared to be Yaku Shima, and the second to be Kyushu.

7. At 2135 SG(A) contact was made at 020deg 72,000 yards. We had been hearing calls of the BRIIDY (DD445), WILSON (DD408), and FOREST (DMS44) on TBS Primary (72.1 megacycles) for a considerable period prior to contact.

8. At 2140 the 8G contacted a--very largo group-of ships at 2250 as they moved onto the if, scope and PPI at maximum range. This group appeared as well
 
defined as other task groups in our own force at 20,000 yards under normal conditions. This was believed to have been a large group of ISTS and LCIS, but was never positively identified.

9. At 2155 the SR contacted land at 0100, 367 miles and also at 410 miles. The echoes were strong and well defined. Echoes out to maximum range were clearly visible on the PPI. These targets when plotted were identified as either mountains on Northern Kyushu, or B29s flying over Kyushu. No targut motion was
 
observed and they were tracked for-more than one hour so it was presumed to be land.

l0. At 2245 Task Group 58.1 was lost by the SG(A) when it moved off the "All scope and PPI at maximum range. The pips on individual ships wore clearly defined at that range and discrimination equal to that of a group at 15,000 yards under normal operating conditions. One of her picket destroyers was tracked on the DRT until it too went off the I'"" scope at extreme range. The strength of its echo at that time was B5.

11. After Task Group 58.1 disappeared from the screen, her TBS transmissions continued to be received - strength 5. modulation 5.

12. At 2340 Okino Daito Shima was picked up on SR bearing 095deg 81 miles. Our ship was then steaming in the vicinity of Latitude 24deg57' N. Longitude 129deg 52'E. Third sweep echoes on Okinawa were observed at this time on the SG(l.).

13. At 1930 on 26 tfay unusual ranges were again observed on both the SG(A)
and SR but the condition persisted for only a short time and ranges were not as
great, aa, previously, mentioned.

C. Unusual Ranges Observed on VHF Radio.

1. Extreme ranges were obtained on TBS primary on many occasions, Their strength, clarity and persistence caused us to evaluate surface contacts incorrectly on several occasions. The importance of knowing the location of friendly ships in the area was illustrated.

2. On the morning of 14 May 1945 while operating in the vicinity%of. latitude 30deg 21'N Longitude 132deg 52'E, Southeast of Kyushu, signals from the Fast British Carrier Forces were heard on primary TBS (72.1 megacycles. Their strength and clarity was similar to that of a task group operating at 30,000 yards under normal conditions. kLt this same time an unknown surface target was contacted by the Task Group Commander's SU radar. This ship reported the TBS transmissions to the Task Group-Commander believing that the transmissions might identify his contact. Our last position on Task Force 57.1 placed them in the vicinity of Sakash:Lna Gurito but it was thought that they might have been called North to augment the Kyushu striko.After an hour the contact failed to materialize and this ship offered the explanation that this was another case of "skip distance'' in which theory the Task Group Commander concurred.

3. Our conclusion was further substantiated when numerous calls of Commander Task Group 52.1 and other ships in his group were heard. They were known to
be operating in the vicinity of Okinawa.

4. This unusual condition existed for almost tour hours. Fxtreme ranges on radar were not observed. The "call ups" wore strength 5, modulation 

5. The first four or five words of the transmission were clear"and the rest of the transmission faded in and out.

5. Similar phenorena were observed many times while operating in tho vicinity of Okinawa. It v.,is not unusual to hear the fueling group, more than 100 miles to the Southeast, tho CVEs about 100 miles to the Southwest, or the ships supporting
the landing on Western Okinawa.

6. The Phenomena described were not limited to TBS alone, but was observed to a lesser degree on WW and VHF rad3'.08.

D. Fade Chart Unreliability.

1. The fade chart developed for our SR radar proved totally unreliable in the tiansci Shotoc. After numerous attempts had been made to calculate altitudes from the fade chart developed in the Hawaiian area, the chart iqas rarely used. From observation on this ship, it appears necessary todraw up a new fade chart for each operating area.

2, - Attempts wcre made to correct the old fade chart from current .information, but the information was too scattered to be of much use. Now fades were continually noted.

3. It is suggested that a drill for the entire task group be held upon entering a new area so that fade charts can be made reliable.

4. It would also be advantageous if some activity could construct predicted fades for different radars in now operating areas and promulgate their findings to the fleet. It may be that fade areas arc too uncertain to hazard any broad scale predicted calculations,

E. "Ghost" Target.

1. Several now targets were observed in the Nonsei principle one being the "Ghost". Reports from submrines had prepared us for this interesting target, but uneasiness was felt at having a target that was invisible to the hwaan eye.

2. (ki several occasions Ghosts were contacted on SR radar giving E2 or E3 echoes but traveling at from 50 to 85 miles per hour. They were observed to 
close the formation, pass over ships on picket duty and eventually completely disappears

3. One "Ghost" made such a suspicious approach that general quarters was 
almost sounded. The key to aircraft Ghost evaluation appeared to be that its 
speed was never over 85 miles per hour. Echoes were never quite as strong as aircraft echoes and they faded in and out.

4. Ghosts on SG Here not uncommon, but the knowledge of ship's movements near the force dismissed most of them as non-target. Also, surface ghosts could 
be identified by shifting the pulse repetition rates and observing the false target to move with the change.

5. Another target observed and responsible for at least one general quarters was a radiosonde balloons It was contacted on air search and fire control radar and tracked at the speed of the upper wind. On two other occasions the AA director was put on target by radar and identified the object as an acrographer's balloon. The object gave a weak indication on the director radar scope.

Part VIII - Lessons Learned, Conclusions, and Recomendations. Pre-Dawn General Quarters.

1. It is considered that the routine pro-dawn general quarters is an anachronism and not justifiable when applied to task units and task groups well equipped with radar. It is certainly in direct conflict with the requirements of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 10CL-44 which requires commanding officers to insure that they and their crews get sufficient rest to maintain unimpaired efficiency and mental alertness.

2, It is suggested that the requirements of LISF10A as to pro-dam manning of battle stations be eliminated.

Copies to: Comch (original, one advance copy) ComCPac (3 advance copies 
only) C.T.U. 58-3.3 (ComCruDiv 17) C.T.G- 58.3 (ComCarDiv 1) ComCruPac File No copies to: C.T.F. 58 ComFIFTH Fleet

K. S. REED






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